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The entrepreneurial nature of local government activities has significantly influenced socio-economic and 
spatial changes in urban China. It was against this backdrop that property-led redevelopment projects were 
implemented in Beijing since 1990 by a programme whose very success depended on the participation of 
developers and prospective homebuyers as major financial contributors. By the end of 1999, roughly one-
fifth of Beijing’s inner city households were directly hit by this programme. In 2000, however, a new 
redevelopment policy was introduced in Beijing, and has received an increasing policy emphasis since then. 
This new policy aims at supplying affordable housing on government-provided land so that it increases 
existing residents’ re-housing rate. In this context, this paper aims at analysing the implications of this shifting 
emphasis on Beijing’s urban redevelopment policy to examine if the local government has become less 
entrepreneurial, thus giving more weight to promoting a more socially inclusive approach. Through a detailed 
examination of two case studies of inner city redevelopment projects, the paper argues that the 
entrepreneurial nature of the local state has remained consistent and characterises the revised redevelopment 
strategy, and that the entrepreneurial state activities are largely supported by the local state power to dispose 
of urban land use rights, which effectively makes the local state as part of urban rentiers as de facto landlords. 
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1. Introduction 
The central role of  the local state in mainland China has been identified as having 
implemented market-oriented reform policies, and led the nation’s unprecedented 
economic growth during the reform period. The state-led development has been 
interpreted by pundits as local state corporatism (Oi, 1995), state entrepreneurialism 
(Duckett, 1998) or local developmental state (Zhu, 2004b), all focusing on the 
entrepreneurial nature of  local state activities that are geared towards local economic 
growth. The decentralisation of  decision-making power has increased the influence of  
local governments, and led to the establishment of  an entrepreneurial stance of  local state 
activities. Entrepreneurial spirit has captured the nation to such an extent that managers, 
entrepreneurs and professional groups seem to be more highly appreciated than workers 
and peasants whose alliance was behind the establishment of  the People’s Republic 
(Gittings, 2006). In the real estate sector, the entrepreneurial orientation of  government 
activities has been sometimes interpreted as having formed an informal coalition with land-
based interests such as (both domestic and foreign) real estate developers (Fang and Zhang, 
2003; Zhu, 1999, 2002). It is argued that the informal coalition has tapped on the 
expanding property market to extract exchange value by converting urban land into a 
higher and better use, supported by the institutional reform to the commodification of  
urban lands. 
It is against this backdrop that the urban redevelopment policies are produced and 
implemented since the early 1990s. Urban redevelopment in Chinese cities has been very 
much influenced by property-led redevelopment (see for example, He and Wu, 2005), and 
Beijing has been no exception. Beijing’s property-led redevelopment has been facilitated 
since 1990 by what has been referred to as the Old and Dilapidated Housing 
Redevelopment Programme (hereafter ODHRP). A municipal survey of  housing 
conditions in Beijing conducted in 1990 revealed that more than one quarter of  inner city 
dwellings required urgent attention due to their structural instability and severe 
deterioration (Liu, 1991, p.16). The mayor of  Beijing gave a speech at the end of  April 
1990, signalling a major shift in the direction of  the city’s urban renewal strategy towards a 
greater adoption of  market principles (Beijing Municipal Government, 1990). The 
particular programme devised thereafter was the ODHRP, and this programme was 
distinguishable from its preceding renewal strategies by the fact that its very success 
depended heavily on the participation of real estate capital and the prospective homebuyers 
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as major financial contributors (He and Wu, 2005; Shin, forthcoming; Zhang and Fang, 
2003). Between 1991 and 1999, the number of  ODHRP projects increased from 37 to 279 
(Fang and Zhang 2003). According to an official estimate, the total number of  Beijing 
residents whose dwellings were demolished as part of  ODHRP projects reached 160,900 
households by the end of  1999 (UCCBMPPCC et al. 2003). Given that most ODHRP 
projects targeted dwellings in inner city districts, this meant that roughly one fifth of  all the 
inner city households were directly affected by the redevelopment. 1  Residents were 
presented with re-housing or relocation rental dwellings (Fang and Zhang, 2003). The 
official line was, however, to encourage off-site relocation by means of  combining 
suburban new estate development with inner city redevelopment (Beijing Municipal 
Government, 1994). It was estimated that less than one third of  those residents displaced 
in the 1990s were re-housed, and the majority of  the remaining households relocated to 
suburban estates assigned by developers (UCCBMPPCC et al., 2003). 
In 2000, after ten years’ implementation of  the market-oriented redevelopment, weigai dai 
fanggai, which could be literally translated as ‘redevelopment accompanied by housing 
improvement’ (Beijing Municipal Government, 2000). While the more market-oriented 
approach was still in place, this new approach has received a growing emphasis in 
subsequent policy documents. Its main feature was to supply affordable housing instead of  
commercial housing so that it becomes more affordable for existing residents’ purchase of  
re-housing flats. The affordable housing programme (known as jingji shiyongfang in Chinese) 
was originally proposed by the central government to make homeownership more 
affordable for low- and middle-income households through subsidies to real estate 
developers (Lee, 2000). The affordable housing programme commenced in 1999 with an 
aim of  building flats on government-allocated lands, and the housing price was regulated 
by local authorities. To the extent that the weigai dai fanggai approach aimed at a high re-
housing rate, it was deemed more socially inclusive. This feature was in a strong contrast 
with the dominant approach of  market-oriented redevelopment. 
                                                 
1 This is based on the total number of  permanently registered households in the four inner city districts of  
Beijing, which was approximately 787,000 households with the average household size of  3.08 persons per 
household (Beijing Municipal Government, 1991). 
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In this context, this paper aims to analyse the implications of  this shifting emphasis of  
Beijing’s urban renewal policy. Two main questions are considered. Firstly, does this revised 
redevelopment policy suggest that the local government has become less entrepreneurial, 
thus giving more weight to its governmental function to promote a more socially inclusive 
approach? Secondly, does this policy shift reflect the change in the way in which land-based 
interests come together to promote urban growth and real estate development? Through a 
detailed examination of  two case studies of  redevelopment projects, the paper shows that 
the revised redevelopment policy is not inherently different from the city’s market-oriented 
practices throughout the 1990s, and that needs to be understood in the context of  local 
entrepreneurial activities that characterised local states in the course of  promoting local 
economic growth. The paper also argues that the entrepreneurial state activities are largely 
supported by the local power to dispose of  urban land use rights, which in fact makes the 
local state as part of  urban rentiers as de facto landlords. 
Few literatures have made a critical evaluation of  urban redevelopment policies in Chinese 
cities during the reform period, and there has been lack of  empirical studies to gain an 
insight into the actual redevelopment processes. Available literatures on urban 
redevelopment in Chinese cities address the issue of  high development costs as the barrier 
to developers’ active participation (Dowall, 1994), potential problems associated with 
residents’ suburban resettlement (Leaf, 1995), residents’ legal disputes upon displacement  
(Johnson, 2004), and the coalition of  land-based interests engaged in urban redevelopment 
(Fang and Zhang, 2003; He and Wu, 2005; Zhang and Fang, 2003). Other literatures on 
more region-wide processes of  urban development during the reform period focus on the 
development of  or transition to new cities under the influence of  globalisation and 
marketisation (Gaubatz, 2005; Logan, 2002; Ma, 2002; Wu, 2000, 2003). It is explained that 
the transition entails the establishment of  a new post-socialist, accumulation regime with 
the development of  an entrepreneurial state (Wu, 2003). “The game of  appropriating the rent 
gap” (Wu, 1997, p.660; original emphasis) seems to lead the changes in the urban built 
environment, defining the way in which different actors behave in the transitional phase of  
urban political economy. Some interpret the changing urban politics in the process of  
institutional transformation (that is, marketisation, fiscal decentralisation and land reform) 
as having contributed to the growth of  local growth coalition in which the entrepreneurial 
local state and developers coalesce to maximise opportunities to obtain development gains 
(He and Wu, 2005; Zhang, 2002; Zhu, 1999). While these studies provide a useful 
framework to reflect upon urban redevelopment processes in Chinese cities, there is a 
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general absence of  empirical studies that examine how a particular policy or a set of  urban 
policies make impact upon urban residents. This gap is what this paper aims to fill in. 
The remaining part of  this paper is consisted of  five sections. Firstly, the paper discusses 
the transition of  urban governance in the developed world from managerialism to urban 
entrepreneurialism that promotes property-led redevelopment through public-private 
partnerships. This is followed by the discussion on the changing governance in Chinese 
cities. The third section describes the progress of  urban redevelopment in the two case 
studies to provide an overview. The fourth section critically examines the nature of  the 
redevelopment policy shift. The final section sums up discussions and draws a conclusion. 
2. Property-led redevelopment and the entrepreneurial state 
Property-led redevelopment has become a governing strategy in post-industrial cities 
particularly during the last two decades of  mounting policy interests in establishing public-
private partnerships for carrying out urban regeneration (Healey et al., 1992; Jones, 1996; 
Quilley, 1999). The private sector assumed a leading role for rebuilding inner city areas 
where problems of  declining industry, decaying infrastructure, poverty concentration and 
social polarisation were prevalent (Edwards, 1984; Gore, 1991; UN-Habitat, 1993). In other 
words, the private sector has become “a legitimate provider of  public policy initiatives,” 
providing finance that used to be largely in the domain of  local authorities (Healey et al., 
1992: 217). As the public sector’s direct intervention in urban renewal and housing 
development was substantially curtailed, public-private partnership was seen as a way of  
tapping the private sector’s financial resources and managerial skills (Cameron, 1992). 
The emphasis on the private sector was accompanied by the changing role of  the public 
sector, which increasingly became an enabler or facilitator, focusing on removing supply-
side constraints and providing incentives and financial subsidies to attract private capital. In 
this process, it is argued that there has been a major shift in urban governance from 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Griffiths, 1998; Harvey, 1989; Quilley, 1999). The 
managerial form of  governance, according to Griffiths (1998, p.42), is characterised by 
state resource allocation and bureaucratic organisation of  social services delivery on the 
basis of  social welfarism. Structural changes (such as the economic recession, declining 
basis of  manufacturing industry in traditional metropolitan areas, and changes in 
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employment structure and relations) have led to the erosion of  the Keynesian accumulation 
regime and thus, the erosion of  the basis of  managerialism. These have resulted in the 
emergence of  urban entrepreneurialism. According to David Harvey, urban 
entrepreneurialism is a new form of  class alliance for cities to survive and succeed in the 
new environment of  diminishing territorial barriers for global capital movement and of  
intense inter-urban competition for jobs, resources and private capital investment (Harvey, 
1989). David Harvey notes: 
“The new urban entrepreneurialism typically rests, then, on a public-private 
partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative 
construction of  place rather than amelioration of  conditions within a particular 
territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic 
goal”  (Harvey, 1989, p.8) 
External pressures for the change include intensifying inter-urban competitions. It is argued 
that the property-led characteristic of  urban regeneration has been strengthened due to the 
deepening process of  globalisation as cities are driven to compete with each other to 
successfully bid for intergovernmental funding or “pin down increasingly fleet-footed 
capital” (Weber, 2002, p.531). Place promotion and urban re-imaging through ‘flagship’ 
projects have become dominant themes of  urban regeneration (Bianchini et al., 1992; 
Wilkinson, 1992). As Quilley noted, “There has been a pervasive homogeneity in the 
models of  urban regeneration pursued by western cities since the 1980s” (Quilley, 1999, 
p.189). Waterfront redevelopment and the creation of  civic centre and shopping malls are 
the oft-cited examples (Cook, 2004). Within local contexts, the increasing rent-gap in 
decaying inner city areas provided opportunities for land-based interests (or urban rentier 
class to use John Logan and Harvey Molotch’s term) to capitalise on exchange value by 
transforming decaying urban space into a higher and better use (Logan and Molotch, 1987; 
Smith, 1996). Development projects in this case often tend to take on the form of  ‘value-
free’ economic growth promoted by the land-based interests or a growth machine (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976). 
The transition from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism, however, should not be 
equated with the withdrawal of  the state. The ‘speculative construction of  place’ under 
entrepreneurialism entails risks, which are absorbed by the local public sector (Harvey, 1989, 
p.7). In fact, according to Harvey, “it is this feature of  risk-absorption by the local (rather 
Hyun Bang Shin 
 
Page 6 
Please note that you are bound by our conditions of use http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/copyright.htm © LSE 2006 
than the national or federal) public sector which distinguishes the present phase of  urban 
entrepreneurialism from earlier phases of  civic boosterism in which private capital seemed 
generally much less risk averse” (ibid, p.7). In other words, public sector subsidies ensure 
“private sector manoeuvrability…especially in areas of  high risk” (Healey et al., 1992, 
p.218). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, both local and central government initiatives 
to enhance private sector participation had “a remarkably consistent approach with the 
promotion of  private investment and confidence by both financial pump priming and the 
removal of  constraints” (Jones, 1996: 205). The transformation from managerialism to 
urban entrepreneurialism in countries like the UK is thus government-led, fuelled by local 
authorities that strive to maintain its limited autonomy in times of  centralisation of  control 
by the central government. As O’Toole and Usher argued: 
“Not only has central government remained highly active in promoting and 
sustaining partnership, but local government, the original object of  exclusion, has 
become increasingly entrepreneurial as it has fought to maintain its position in the 
public policy arena of  economic development” (O'Toole and Usher, 1992, p.219) 
3. Urban (re-)development in Chinese cities and land-based interests 
Cities experiencing their economic transition to a post-socialist market economy are often 
grouped together and referred to as ‘transitional cities’. Debates about transitional cities 
often concern whether or not they represent a qualitatively different path of  urban 
development. Fulong Wu disapproves this, asserting that “Transitional cities are not 
themselves a prototype of  something qualitatively different from the emerging neoliberal 
city. Indeed, transitional cities are variants of  the latter, based on historical and geographical 
contingencies” (Wu, 2003, p.1337). This perspective helps us understand the emergence of  
entrepreneurial and profit-seeking behaviour of  local governments in cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, which compete for inward investment and foster local economic 
growth while still bound by ‘historical and geographical contingencies’. 
The real estate sector in Chinese cities has been one of  the major growth poles, and the 
municipalities’ endeavour to attract and increase investment resulted in the strengthening 
of  urban place-making, re-imaging and intense transformation of  urban land uses through 
property (re-)development. This endeavour has been enhanced through the process of  
‘Entrepreneurial’ local state:  
The implications of Beijing’s shifting emphasis on urban redevelopment policies 
Page 7 
Please note that you are bound by our conditions of use http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/copyright.htm © LSE 2006 
decentralisation of  state power to make economic decisions and to share tax revenues 
between central and local governments, thus increasing the degree of  local autonomy for 
resource mobilisation and economic planning (Wei, 1996). Through the decentralisation, 
the state control over budget and economic planning became weaker, with the state 
budgetary contribution to the national investment in fixed assets declining, for instance, 
from 28.1% in 1981 to 2.7% in 1996 (NBS China, 2002, Table 6-3 and 6-7). Through the 
decentralisation, the sources of investment in urban built environment have been 
diversified. While the state budgetary contribution rate has decreased substantially as 
mentioned above, the balance was supplemented by the increase in funds ‘self-raised’ by 
local governments and locally based enterprises (Wu, 1997, p.654). The increasing share of 
self-raised funds in the investment in fixed assets and capital construction “enables new 
projects to be funded outside state resource allocation” (ibid.). The decentralisation has 
fostered localization in terms of investment flow. Various fees are now charged by 
municipal governments upon the use of land and urban infrastructure by enterprises (ibid, 
p.655). The local governments have also gained greater control over state-owned 
enterprises throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The control rights over state-owned 
enterprises were gradually transferred from their supervisory central government agencies 
to local governments: “By 1994, it was estimated that local governments at various levels 
controlled approximately 65% of the assets of all state-owned enterprises” (China Reform 
Foundation, 1997 cited in Li and Lian, 1999, p.178). 
Decentralisation has also led to the intense competition for finite resources among 
localities, which is more like a zero-sum game, leading to the hierarchical ordering of  cities 
depending on their strength to attract inward investment of  both domestic and foreign 
capital (Logan et al., 1999). This is closely related with the inter-urban competition among 
Chinese cities to take advantage of  the Open Door policies and the gradualist state-led 
absorption of  Chinese cities in globalisation processes (Wu, 2001, 2002). The investment 
structure of  Beijing’s urban redevelopment projects in the 1990s represent the heavy 
influence of  foreign capital. For instance, due to lack of  state funds allocated for Beijing’s 
ODHRP projects, the Beijing municipal government, and subsequently district 
governments, encouraged the use of  foreign investment. Between 1990 and 1997, 68.1% 
of  total investment in ODHRP in Beijing’s inner city districts came from foreign 
investment. In Dongcheng District (where the two case study neighbourhoods for this 
paper are situated), the share was even higher, reaching 84.3% (Luo and Zhou, 1998, p.5). 
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In the process of  implementing reform measures such as decentralisation, local 
governments under fiscal pressure became more entrepreneurial in the way that reflects the 
legacy of  the party state, combining uniquely with the newly arrived market environments. 
For instance, Jane Duckett finds in her study of  Tianjin’s real estate management and 
commerce departments that “market reform has created opportunities and constraints for 
officials in these departments that have led them to see business as a viable way of  solving 
their financial and staffing problems” (Duckett, 1998, p.153). It is argued that this model of  
state entrepreneurialism emerges as part of  “the entrepreneurial activities of  state officials 
aimed at producing profits for their bureaux” (ibid, p.155). Oi (1995) notes that the 
institutional changes in the reform era “blended the entrepreneurial and governmental 
roles of  local governments” (p.1139), resulting in the use of  local administrative 
bureaucracy for facilitating market production, and for funding corporate growth often 
through preferential allocation. This indicates that under the increased fiscal pressure, the 
local state activities are becoming entrepreneurial, and the local state transforms itself  from 
a regulator of  local enterprises to their advocates to maximise local interests (pp.1144-46). 
The promotion of  local interests rather than national interests runs through the arguments 
of  other researchers who focus on the way in which a strong bonding occurs among newly 
emerging land-related interests while pursuing property rights reform to allow the 
transaction of  state-owned land use rights (He and Wu, 2005; Zhang, 2002; Zhu, 1999, 
2002). For instance, Zhu (1999) argues that ‘informal local urban regimes’ have been 
established, which “compete for local growth by capitalising on financial gains from urban 
land and property development” (p.546). The informal coalition is said to have emerged as 
a result of  ambiguous property rights under gradual urban land reform that failed to 
delineate a clear notion of  land use-right ownership among the land users from the pre-
reform period (Zhu, 2002). A similar growth-oriented alliance appears to have formed not 
only in big cities but also at less developed country levels for the promotion of  cross-
border economic development zones (Luo and Shen, 2004). 
4. Market-oriented, property-led redevelopment of the Xinzhongjie 
neighbourhood 
For this analysis, I take two empirical case studies. Two cases are the redevelopment 
projects in two inner city neighbourhoods, Xinzhongjie and Haiyuncang, both situated in 
one of  Beijing’s inner city districts called Dongcheng District. The redevelopment of  the 
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Xinzhongjie neighbourhood corresponds to the market-oriented ODHRP (hereafter 
Xinzhongjie model), and the redevelopment of  Haiyuncang neighbourhood refers to the 
revised ODHRP, that is weigai dai fanggai (hereafter Haiyuncang model). 
The case study of  the Xinzhongjie neighbourhood redevelopment is discussed in-depth 
herein so as to help us gain a detailed understanding of  the municipality’s market-oriented 
ODHRP so that it can be contrasted with the case study of  revised OHDRP for a more 
vivid understanding about how these two approaches differ from each other. 
4.1 Project overview 
Location-wise, the Xinzhongjie neighbourhood lies just outside the eastern section of  
Beijing’s second ring road, situated across the Worker’s Stadium. Its redevelopment was 
representative of  Beijing’s redevelopment practices in the 1990s, that is, market-oriented 
commercial redevelopment led by both local and foreign real estate developers. In total, 8.5 
hectare of  dilapidated neighbourhood was initially subject to redevelopment (Editorial 
Committee of  Beijing Dongcheng District, 2000, p.330). The total construction space, as 
envisaged at the project outset by the district government was 255,000 square metres, 
leading to an average floor-to-area ratio of  300%. The whole project aimed at transforming 
the existing neighbourhood into a mix use to combine residential, retail and business 
functions.2 The neighbourhood was divided into six districts (Districts A to F), and the 
neighbourhood redevelopment was phased in. The first phase redevelopment subjected 
Districts A and D, and lasted about two years from the residents’ displacement at the end 
of  1999. The completion of  the first phase resulted in four high-rise blocks of  commercial 
flats (named as the Sun City estate) in Districts A and D whose combined surface area 
reached 2.3 hectare. The second phase was yet to start as of  March 2007 (see Figure 1). 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise mentioned, the source of  information on the status and progress of  Xinzhongjie 
neighbourhood redevelopment in this sub-section is from the Dongcheng district government news web site 
(http://www.bjdch.gov.cn/), and also from the author’s interview with a former manager affiliated with 
China Homes Limited who wished to remain anonymous. 
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4.2 Partnership with local and foreign capital 
The work was carried out by the alliance of  the local government, local developers and 
foreign investors who collaborated to execute the project. Homebuyers, who contributed 
their money through off-purchase of  redevelopment flats, could also be regarded as part 
of  the alliance of  the land-based interests (see Figure 2). Here, the local authority, in a 
narrow sense, refers to Dongzhimen Street Office that directly administers the 
neighbourhood affairs, but more broadly speaking, would also include the district 
government who was given a more autonomous status in terms of  administering the 
transaction of  land use rights. The local representative of  the foreign investment was China 
Homes Limited (hereafter China Homes). The foreign investment itself  originated from 
two overseas investors, one of  which was a US-based insurance company, Prudential 
Financial, which held 100% share of  the Bermuda-based PRICOA China (Residential) Ltd. 
China Homes was a subsidiary of  PRICOA China (Residential). The other overseas 
investor was Tan & Tan Developments Berhad, a Malaysia-based investor. A joint venture 
was established between China Homes Limited and a locally based real estate developer 
(Beijing Zhonghong Real Estate Company Ltd.; hereinafter Beijing Zhonghong) in order to 
carry out Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment, and was named as Beijing Huaju 
Workers’ Gymnasium Real Estate Development Company Ltd. (hereinafter Beijing Huaju). 
Developers behind the Xinzhongjie project were proud of  the overseas investment, 
advertising in their marketing posters that the Sun City realises the life style of  other global 
cities like Paris and Rome. They were also proud to illustrate that the Sun City project was 
backed by a Fortune 500 company as the major investor. China Homes held 95% share of  
the newly established Beijing Huaju in order to take full operational control of  the 
company. Beijing Zhonghong held the remaining 5%, but their role was essential as they 
held the land development right, secured from the local government. The joint venture 
invested at least one third of  the total project costs to meet the minimum investment 
requirement as per related government regulations. The rest of  the project costs were 
financed through the sales of  Sun City flats. The former manager at China Homes 
commented: 
“30% of  the total project costs were required to be invested as minimum capital by 
us investors. This was used for the payment of  land premium after the project lands 
were granted, and also for some upfront construction costs. Two thirds of  the total 
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project costs were then financed by the bank mortgages and down payment by the 
homebuyers.”  (Former manager at China Homes Limited) 
The land lease in the case of  the Xinzhongjie redevelopment was through negotiation 
instead of  market competition through a bidding process, which was the most widely 
utilised method in Beijing for the most period of  the 1990s. For example, in 1996, only 
3.7% of  newly developed lands were leased out through tender or auction, while the rest 
were transacted via negotiation. In major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, there 
was no case of  tender or auction (Wu, 2001, pp.276-277). The predominance of  price 
negotiation as a land lease method over tender or auction has led to the arbitrary 
determination of  land value, increasing the risk of  land transaction through arbitrary 
decision-making and possibly corruption and informal relationship. 
The use of foreign investment and the densification led to the changing landscape from a 
low-rise dilapidated neighbourhood to a high-rise modern estate. Upon completion of  the 
first phase redevelopment, the total construction space built on the land parcel of  23,000 
square metres reached nearly 140,000 square metres, resulting in the floor-to-area ratio of  
about 610%. This was much higher than the originally envisaged 300%. The orientation of  
the district government towards the real estate development and its strong emphasis on the 
sector for its economic development would explain such preference of  high building 
density. For the developers, the increased built density would be equal to higher returns to 
their investment. As for the local authority, the transformation of the neighbourhood 
provides the basis of increased tax revenue, and proves the competitiveness of its 
administrative capacity. 
4.3 Local residents’ permanent displacement 
The neighbourhood redevelopment has been an effective process that threatened existing 
residents’ way of living. When old and dilapidated neighbourhoods are subject to market-
oriented real estate redevelopment, the majority of  existing residents are much more likely 
to face permanent displacement from their neighbourhoods due to unaffordable prices of  
redeveloped commercial flats. Developers’ commercial interests would prevail, assisted by 
the local authority. This is exemplified by the Xinzhongjie redevelopment. When the Sun 
City estate was proposed as the end product of  the Xinzhongjie redevelopment, local 
officials at the Dongzhimen Street Office projected that only about ten to twenty per cent 
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of  local residents would be re-housed upon project completion. Upon project completion 
early 2002, a far less number of  residents could afford to be re-housed: only about twenty 
households (or 3.6 per cent) out of  550 displaced came back for re-housing. 
The permanent displacement of  local residents was due to the affordability problem 
caused by the high sales price of  completed commercial flats. Although local residents were 
given a preferential price, which was one third less than the average market price, the sales 
price was still far beyond their reach. For instance, a two-bedroom family unit with a 
construction space of  110 square metres would have cost about 600,000 yuan, resulting in 
the price-to-annual household disposable income ratio of  sixteen to one for an average 
Beijing household, and thirty to one for a household belonging to the bottom twenty per 
cent of  income decile distribution (Beijing Municipal Bureau of  Statistics, 2003). Even if  
they could afford to purchase a flat by mobilising their available financial resources and/or 
relying on their social network, the living costs would be too high to sustain long-term 
residence. Of  the twenty re-housed households at Xinzhongjie, it was found that fourteen 
households moved elsewhere within the next eighteen months. The interviews with two of  
the remaining households suggested that they moved out due to the difficulties in meeting 
the high living costs in high-rise apartments. 
As for the permanently displaced households, their post-displacement housing experiences 
were expected to be conforming to ‘market-oriented practices’, that is, either house buying 
or private renting, as they were left with cash compensation only. This was due to the major 
change in the compensation method in 1998, which imposed cash-based cash 
compensation instead of  in-kind compensation. Before 1998, urban households displaced 
from their neighbourhoods due to redevelopment and land use change were given in-kind 
compensation, which meant that they were provided a relocation dwelling where they could 
continue their pre-displacement housing tenure. This practice faced a complete change in 
1998 when the central government called for the termination of  all types of  in-kind 
housing benefits. The municipal measure for redevelopment compensation, announced in 
1998 (Beijing Municipal Government, 1998), called for the implementation of  cash-based 
compensation. Although the announcement allowed the provision of  relocation dwellings 
under certain conditions, the dominance of  cash-based compensation was what local 
frontline officials understood. 
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4.4 The local state as an enabler 
The experiences of  the Xinzhongjie redevelopment showed that Beijing’s redevelopment 
was executed within the policy framework of  a partnership with real estate capital (in this 
case, both local and foreign) for the transformation of  dilapidated neighbourhoods into 
commercial high-rise estates of  much higher building density. Real estate developers and 
local government made a contractual relationship for the land lease and redevelopment of  
the Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. The Sun City project was a success from the local 
authority perspective that opted for the transformation of  its built environment into a 
modern cityscape. The local authority’s inadequate financial resources and expertise to 
manage such a large-scale development in the locality were compensated by the 
participation of  foreign investment through the establishment of  a joint venture with a 
local private developer. To do this, the local authority made use of  its business network to 
bring together domestic and foreign developers. 
The Sun City project had favourable conditions such as high density, high sales price, good 
location and thus possibilities of  high returns to investment, which were attractive for the 
developers to participate. It exemplifies the formation of  local alliance of  land-based 
interests that brought together the local government, domestic and foreign real estate 
developers whose stakes were in realising development profits. This practice has 
increasingly become a common practice in urban China in transforming old 
neighbourhoods in good locations with a high land value, where high returns to capital 
investment are promising (Wang, 2003, p.258). The intense investment in the real estate 
sector in the 1990s presented opportunities to extract market rents from urban land and 
dwellings (Wu, 1997). Global inward investment made a significant contribution to urban 
restructuring in cities like Shanghai, facilitated by the institutional and economic reform 
that enabled revenue generation from selling urban space (Wu, 2000). The case of  Sun City 
project in the Xinzhongjie neighbourhood is a typical example of  how foreign investment 
was invited to take part in the city’s redevelopment projects. The local residents in this 
process gave away their ‘right to space’ to make way for the entry of  developers and more 
affluent homebuyers. 
5. ‘State entrepreneurialism’ and the revised ODHRP 
The Planning and Construction Committee of  Dongcheng District Government 
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acknowledged that the cost structure of  ODHRP projects was not rationale, stating that 
one third of  the total project cost was due to development-related taxes, while another 
third was incurred by residents’ displacement and relocation (Planning and Construction 
Committee of  Dongcheng District Government, 1998, p.17). Having piloted the approach 
in selected neighbourhoods, several neighbourhoods were chosen as exemplary cases for 
the official implementation of  the revised approach. Haiyuncang neighbourhood, discussed 
herein, was among them. In this section, the Haiyuncang model is used interchangeably to 
refer to the revised ODHRP. 
5.1 Project overview 
In order to implement this revised ODHRP, local authorities assumed a more pro-active 
role. The district government transformed one of  its bureaus to establish Dongcheng 
Housing Development Corporation (hereafter Dongcheng HDC), and it was this public 
agency that acted as the principal developer for the Haiyuncang redevelopment. 
Demolition and construction works were contracted out. Local officials estimated that 1.5 
billion yuan was spent in total for the project (CCHS, 2004). The project finance was to 
come from both the local government and residents’ contribution (that is, payment for 
their re-housing flats). The exemption of  land use charges, which applied to the 
construction of  affordable housing, also provided the reason for price deduction compared 
to other commercial housing sales. 
The project area for the Haiyuncang redevelopment reached 26.8 hectare (Dongcheng 
District Government of  Beijing, 2002, p.256). The official notice for residents’ 
displacement and demolition was disseminated on 18 May 2001. Displacement and 
demolition works took place within less than fifty days, and was praised by the then deputy 
mayor of  Beijing for being swift. According to the information from the Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood committee, 5,319 households in total (12,252 people) were displaced. This 
also indicated that the average population density of  the neighbourhood before 
displacement reached about 45,939 people per square kilometre, which exceeded by far the 
average population density of  Dongcheng District (25,847 people per square kilometre in 
2002) (Beijing Municipal Bureau of  Statistics, 2003). The building work took approximately 
fifteen months, and the original residents’ re-housing started in November 2002 
(Dongcheng District Government of  Beijing, 2003). Figure 3 shows the façade of  
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medium-rise completed blocks in the southern part of  the redeveloped neighbourhood. 
5.2 High re-housing rate 
Re-housing flats were for sales only, thus prohibiting any buy-to-let practices. According to 
an official at the Housing Management Department of  the Dongzhimen Street Office, the 
sales price of  a self-contained flat for Haiyuncang redevelopment project was set at a 
ceiling of  5,000 yuan per square metre. The full price of  a completed three bedroom re-
housing flat with a construction space of  seventy five square metres would cost 
approximately 375,000 yuan, equivalent to about eleven years’ accumulation of  an average 
Beijing household’s annual disposable income. The original residents in Haiyuncang, 
however, could enjoy discounts by taking into account their working years and the 
construction space of  their original dwellings. Long-term housing loans were arranged by 
the local government in accordance with the related regulations (Beijing Municipal 
Government, 2000). 
The Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee specified that, among the 5,319 households 
displaced from the neighbourhood, 3,716 households (10,880 people) were re-housed in 
the neighbourhood upon project completion. This led to the re-housing rate of  seventy per 
cent, which was very high compared to the re-housing rates in other market-oriented 
redevelopment projects such as the Xinzhongjie redevelopment. Those residents who did 
not choose the re-housing option received cash compensation, and were to find a dwelling 
on their own, which included the purchase of  affordable housing in a suburban estate 
outside the north-eastern section of  the fifth ring road. The arrangement was made by the 
Dongcheng district government: 
“Our district government has an affordable housing estate at Tiantongyuan area in 
Changping district…Here, we issue a certificate, and the residents take it to go and 
relocate in that area. The sales price is 2,650 yuan per square metre…That’s relatively 
cheap. If  you are not satisfied with the place, you can go to other places on your own 
and choose a house, somewhere in Chaoyang or Daxing. For example, if  you are 
particularly worse off  and cannot come back for re-housing, you can relocate to these 
areas, as the houses there are cheap, but nobody went there. It was too far away.” 
 (Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee leader) 
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The high re-housing rate achieved in the Haiyuncang model was received as a positive 
feature by local residents. In order to see how much a household would have to pay to be 
re-housed and how much the same household would have received if  it chose cash 
compensation, I took the example of  a Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee leader 
whose family was also re-housed upon project completion. Her family was a four-person 
household, which used to live in a non self-contained dwelling with a construction space of  
thirty two square metres, and was re-housed in a three-bedroom flat with a construction 
space of  around seventy five square metres. The total amount her family had to pay 
reached 130,000 yuan, which was only about one third of  the full price of  an affordable 
housing flat of  the same size in Dongcheng district.3 If  her family had chosen cash 
compensation instead of  re-housing, she would have received only about 190,040 yuan, 
which was far inadequate to buy even a one-bedroom affordable housing flat whose 
minimum space was about forty five square metres. 
5.3 Raising people’s degree of accepting redevelopment 
The high prospect of  re-housing in the Haiyuncang model seemed to have appealed to 
local residents. The residents living in Xinzhongjie’s second phase redevelopment area were 
particularly attracted by this, as they have witnessed in front of  their eyes the fate of  their 
neighbours’ permanent displacement brought by a more profit-oriented redevelopment. 
They were in favour of  the Haiyuncang model that would allow them a better chance to 
stay put in the city where all the social services of  high standard could be within easy reach. 
For instance: 
“It should be weigai with fanggai for us. Here, it was only weigai (that is, redevelopment) 
without fanggai (that is, housing improvement). It was just redevelopment, building 
                                                 
3 The detailed methods for estimating the re-housing prices and cash compensation could be found on the 
district government’s web site that showed information on the guideline for carrying out the revised ODHRP 
in Jiaodaokou neighbourhood (Dongcheng District Government of  Beijing, 2001a). Because this 
neighbourhood was based in Dongcheng district and its redevelopment commenced at the same time as the 
work in Haiyuncang, the guideline could be safely assumed to have applied to Haiyuncang redevelopment as 
well. 
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commercial flats. This kind of  redevelopment is not right. Towards all of  us, there 
should not be any profits involved” 
 (54-year-old laid-off  female resident) 
“The best option is to have the weigai (that is, the Haiyuncang model in this context). 
In the case of  weigai, all that required is to pay one hundred thousand odd yuan. If  
you ask me to pay more than two or three hundred thousand yuan (that is, in the case 
of  the Xinzhongjie model), that is not possible. I think weigai is more considerate for 
us… I just hope it’s going to be re-housing on site, because I am really well-
acquainted with this community. I am used to living here. Environment, transport, all 
very convenient…” (44-year-old female resident living on income support) 
This favourable view was, however, with no clear reference to how they would finance the 
purchase if  re-housed. For those who were re-housed in Haiyuncang, long-term loans from 
the housing provident fund (hereafter HPF) were arranged for qualified residents. Just 
before re-housing started, 1,894 applications (that is, about half  the re-housed households) 
from Haiyuncang were approved, the total loan amount reaching 245 million yuan 
(Dongcheng District Government of  Beijing, 2001b). It was not known, however, how 
many applicants failed to receive the housing loans. To qualify for the HPF loans, it is 
essential for applicants to have a stable job and income. They should also have kept their 
HPF accounts for at least preceding twelve months, into which they must have contributed 
consecutively during the last six months (Beijing Ribao 2003). The 44-year-old female 
interviewee above, for instance, had no member of  her family who was in possession of  a 
HPF account, and thus was not eligible for the formal sector loan. 
Resorting to formal sector housing loans also involved commitment to monthly loan 
payment that might be beyond one’s household income capacity. For instance, the 
neighbourhood committee leader whose family borrowed 60,000 yuan to pay for her 
130,000 yuan re-housing flat, was paying back 600 yuan each month by spreading the loan 
repayment over ten years in instalment. For a family in Beijing whose income level 
belonged to the bottom twenty per cent of  the income decile distribution, this would 
constitute about one third (thirty seven per sent) of  monthly household disposable income 
(Beijing Municipal Bureau of  Statistics, 2003). 
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5.4 Reducing the backlog of urban redevelopment 
The implementation of  the Haiyuncang model has, however, substantially reduced the 
backlog of  urban redevelopment in inner city districts and near sub-urban areas, freeing up 
state-owned lands for more profitable and commercial use. Between 1991 and 1995, the 
total number of  residents displaced by urban redevelopment projects in Beijing as a whole 
reached approximately 100,000 households (Beijing Municipal Government, 1996: 272). 
During the next five-year period between 1996 and 2000, the total number of  displaced 
residents amounted to about 83,000 households, less than what was achieved in the 
previous period (Beijing Municipal Government, 2001: 279). With the implementation of  
the new approach as applied to the Haiyuncang neighbourhood, however, the total number 
of  Beijing residents in inner city and near suburban districts, whose dwellings were 
demolished due to redevelopment, reached 93,000 households in 2001, which surpassed 
the number of  residents affected by redevelopment during the previous five years (Beijing 
Municipal Government, 2002, p.234). 
In Dongcheng district where the Xinzhongjie and Haiyuncang neighbourhoods were 
located, the official estimate indicates that redevelopment activities as well as residents’ 
large-scale displacement peaked in 2001 and 2002 when the Haiyuncang model was in full 
scale implementation. The total number of  displaced residents in 2001 alone amounted to 
approximately 22,500 households (roughly 65,000 people). The report was proud to state 
that this figure exceeded the total number of  residents displaced during the previous ten 
years, implying the efficacy of  the new Haiyuncang model of  urban redevelopment 
(Dongcheng District Government of  Beijing, 2002). This meant that about twelve per cent 
of  the residents in Dongcheng district were displaced in one year in 2001. As shown in 
Table 1, about one quarter of  all the formally registered residents in Dongcheng district 
were affected by the redevelopment projects between 2000 and 2005. 
5.5 The entrepreneurial local state 
Beijing’s urban planning guideline aims at reducing overall population density in inner city 
districts by approximately fifteen per cent by 2010. The completion status of  the 
Haiyuncang neighbourhood indicated that the displacement of  existing residents did 
accompany the reduction in population density of  the project area as a whole. According 
to the summary of  the Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee, the number of  total 
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residents displaced from the Haiyuncang neighbourhood reached 12,252 (5,319 
households) with the population density of  45,939 people per square kilometre. Upon 
completion of  the neighbourhood redevelopment, the population density for the project 
area as a whole decreased slightly to 40,795 people per square kilometre (see Table 2). 
A closer examination of  each sub-district and its population density, however, indicates that 
the post-redevelopment residential areas (that is, District A and District D) experienced 
substantially higher density post-redevelopment. For instance, District D, where medium-
rise residential blocks were built on the total surface area of  12.81 hectare (0.13 square 
kilometres), accommodated 7,800 residents (2,600 households). This resulted in its 
population density of  60,890 people per square kilometre. District A turned out to have a 
much higher density, as high-rise flats were constructed on a smaller land. 
What happened was that re-housed residents were squeezed into a much smaller 
neighbourhood as the public housing corporation set up by the district government 
reserved some of  the appropriated lands for infrastructure provision or property 
development to create business/commercial uses. The residents’ complaints regarding the 
substantially increased density were heightened in a recent court hearing that took place on 
13 March 2005. According to a local newspaper report, the Beijing City Planning 
Committee was accused of  having tacitly increased the density of  four high-rise blocks 
(Block Nos. 1, 4, 6 and 9) in District A by adding one storey without raising the building 
height (Jinghua Shibao, 2005). Homeowners filed a collective law suit against the municipal 
government, claiming that such design changes were not explained to them, and were 
contrary to what was presented at the time of  signing the re-housing contract before 
displacement. 
The reserved land, District B, was then subdivided and leased out by the Dongcheng 
Housing Corporation to business enterprises and developers, which looked for available 
lands to provide well-accessed business premises or carry out profitable real estate 
development in strategic inner city locations. The data from the Beijing Municipal Bureau 
of  State Land and Resources indicated that these companies included CapitaLand China (a 
wholly owned subsidiary of  a Singaporean real estate developer, CapitaLand Limited) and 
Beijing Mobile Communications. The land use premium seemed to have been quite 
phenomenal. For instance, CapitaLand China signed a contract to lease a plot of  1.47 
hectare for business and commercial development, and the land use charge paid amounted 
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to 175.8 million yuan, which was equivalent to about twelve per cent of  the officially 
estimated total projects costs of  the Haiyuncang redevelopment (Huaxia Shibao, 2004). 
Beijing Mobile Communications had to pay 89.4 million yuan for leasing a plot of  1.25 
hectare. Why the land lease was cheaper for Beijing Mobile Communications in comparison 
with CapitaLand China is not known. It could be because CapitaLand China envisaged 
mixed use real estate development while Beijing Mobile Communications proposed office 
development for its own use. It could also be because CapitaLand was a subsidiary of  an 
overseas developer while Beijing Mobile Communications had a more intimate network 
with the municipal government. 
This practice of  Dongcheng Housing Development Corporation indicates that its 
performance was in the same manner as private developers and was making development 
gains under the disguise of  carrying out socially more inclusive goals of  re-housing original 
residents. This suggested that the local authority itself  turned into a business-oriented 
entrepreneurial entity that paid more attention to profit and revenue maximisation and 
relatively less attention to the housing welfare of  residents within its jurisdiction. About 
1,600 households had to be permanently displaced to make way for this profit and revenue 
maximisation strategy, which involved domestic and foreign capital as well as the local 
government (see Figure 4). Re-housed residents also became part of  the land-based 
interests as their financial contribution was essential for project implementation, and they 
received benefits of  property redevelopment. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the change in Beijing’s urban policy employed by the Beijing 
municipality to implement city-wide urban renewal activities. Urban renewal in Beijing, like 
in other Chinese cities, largely consisted of  wholesale demolition and redevelopment of  
existing dwellings. The Xinzhongjie model discussed in this paper represented the city’s 
market-oriented ODHRP implemented since the early 1990s, replacing dilapidated 
dwellings with high-rise commercial flats at the expense of  displacing most local residents. 
This commercial approach to neighbourhood redevelopment invoked widespread 
disapproval among local residents, and hence, disapproval of  those parties taking part in 
the alliance of  land-based interests. The Haiyuncang model, on the other hand, seemed to 
advocate the value of  social inclusion at a first glance by emphasising original residents’ re-
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housing. In practice, however, it could be interpreted as a way of  maximising real estate 
development activities in inner city districts of  Beijing. Existing residents were squeezed 
into a much smaller neighbourhood, while the local district government released the rest of  
the existing neighbourhood to market entities who searched for strategic inner city 
locations to build their business premises. The entrepreneurial behaviour of  the local state 
remains persistent, and the ‘state entrepreneurialism’ remains to be “an important new 
dimension of  state activity” (Duckett, 1998, p.153). 
In reform China, it is argued that the moral capacity of  local governments as social 
protectors and market regulators is often challenged as local officials are increasingly under 
pressure to meet the various requests from ‘socialist land masters’ (that is, de facto owners 
of  urban lands) and achieve local economic accumulation (Hsing, 2006). It could perhaps 
be this moral imperative that led to the production of  the revised Haiyuncang model by the 
Beijing municipality. In mainland China, the pre-reform practice of  land ownership and its 
allocation for use was based on the principle of  ‘socialist people’s ownership’, which in 
effect entrusted the right to control and dispose urban land to the state as an embodiment 
of  public interests (Zhu, 2004a, p.1251). The case of  the Haiyuncang model shows that the 
local state maintains its role as an ‘embodiment of  public interests’ but in a very 
entrepreneurial way that has been consistent for many years. Thus, the moral imperative 
lures residents to be more receptive to city-wide demolition, making urban land use change 
more effective and efficient. 
The commodification of  urban lands, however, was coupled with the establishment of  
“ambiguous property rights’, which led to the “de facto control of  assets but without 
complete legal responsibility” (Zhu, 2002, p.54). Unlike the pre-reform experience of  
administrative allocation of  urban lands, the transfer of  land use rights in market ways 
provided enormous revenue-raising opportunities for the public sector, helping local 
governments pursue their own development programmes. For example, the sales revenue 
of  land use rights in Beijing reached, according to the official statistics, thirty two per cent 
of  total municipal government income in 1995, and twenty one per cent in 1996 (Li, 1999, 
p.196). 
The entrepreneurial activities by local authorities were made possible in the Haiyuncang 
model largely due to their power to dispose urban land use rights, which was devolved to 
the local district government in the early 1990s. Through this power, local authorities have 
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remained largely as an enabler and facilitator of  redevelopment processes in inner city 
districts while implementing market-oriented ODHRP programmes since its inception. 
The Xinzhongjie model illustrates their enabling role as the local district government 
sought financial assistance from overseas investors to realise the neighbourhood’s 
redevelopment. In the Haiyuncang model, the local district government was more pro-
actively entrepreneurial, became part of  local entrepreneurs or part of  ‘urban rentiers’, and 
presented urban redevelopment to be more attractive to local residents. In this process, the 
risks entailed by urban redevelopment were absorbed effectively by the local government, 
safe-guarding the interests of  land-based alliance. By offering more affordable re-housing 
flats, part of  local residents joined the land-based interests as their financial contribution 
was essential for project implementation, and they received benefits of  property 
redevelopment. The Haiyuncang model also won support from the general public by re-
packaging redevelopment programmes as being more socially inclusive. As a result, the 
municipality would succeed in fastening the pace of  urban redevelopment of  dilapidated 
inner city neighbourhoods so that modern flats could replace shanty dwellings, business 
interests have access to strategic locations, and modern landscape could be achieved for the 
preparation of  the 2008 Olympic Games. This would result in local authorities gaining a 
large amount of  land lease revenues, property- and development-related taxes that could be 
fed back into urban infrastructure provision to upgrade urban functions. Therefore, the 
revised ODHRP model since 2000 has been put forward to serve the interests of  land-
based alliance that is consisted of  real estate capital, the local government and relatively 
affluent members of  local population. 
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Figure 2. Land-based interests in Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment 
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Figure 3. View of medium-rise blocks in the southern part of redevelopd Haiyuncang (photograph by the author)  
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Table 1. Scale of residents' displacement in Dongcheng District in Beijing 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  Total 
Displaced residents 
(households) 
3,712 22,500 13,000 2,399 2,949 3,012  47,572 
% of total formally 
registered residents(1) 
2.0% 12.2% 7.0% 1.3% 1.6% 1.6%  25.7% 
Note: 
(1) Based on the 2002 Census result that there were 536,000 people formally registered in the district. The average size of a household 
in Beijing is assumed to be 2.9. 
Source: Dongcheng District Yearbook (each year) 
 
 
Table 2. Pre- and Post-redevelopment land use details for the Haiyuncang redevelopment 
 
Pre-redevelopment Post-redevelopment 
Number of residents Surface 
area 





(h/h) (people) (km2) (people/km2) 
Districts 
(h/h) (people) (km2) (people/km2) 
Built form 
5,319 12,252 0.27 45,939 Total 3,716 10,880 0.27 40,795  
    District A 1,116 3,080 0.03 98,718 High-/medium-rise; 
residential 
    District D 2,600 7,800 0.13 60,890 Medium-rise; 
residential 
    District B - - 0.04 - Business/commercial  
    Public use - - 0.07 - Infrastructure  
(roads, etc.) 
Source: Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee; Dongcheng District Yearbook 2001 
 
